FGM in India: The 2026 Supreme Court hearing explained

Photo: Masooma Ranalvi, We Speak Out

India’s nine-judge Constitution Bench has heard arguments on Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution vis-à-vis female genital mutilation (FGM). Here is what happened, and what it means for the movement to end FGM in India.

In April 2026, India’s apex court began hearing arguments on the scope of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution in a case involving different matters, including women’s right to enter religious spaces, excommunication and FGM, amongst others. 

On 7 May 2026, the nine-judge Constitution Bench heard arguments on behalf of a survivor of FGM from the Dawoodi Bohra community, and made some of the strongest oral observations on the practice to date. The bench signalled that FGM can fall under the exceptions of public health and morality, which can restrict the right to freedom of religion under Article 25. These were oral observations, not a judgment. But for a movement that has waited nine years for this hearing, they mark a turning point. 

Equality Now’s global research on FGM reveals the existence of the practice in 94 countries, out of which only 59 have laws prohibiting the same. And India is not one of them. 

How it started

The legal challenge to FGM in India began in 2017, when Delhi-based lawyer Sunita Tiwari filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court. The petition asked the court to declare FGM unconstitutional, direct the government to enact a specific anti-FGM law, and ensure prosecution under existing criminal provisions.

In India, FGM is practised primarily within the Dawoodi, Suleimani, and Alvi Bohra communities, where it is known as khatna or khafz. It has also been documented among some Sunni Muslim sub-sects in Kerala, where it is locally known as Sunnath. Independent research by survivor-led organisation WeSpeakOut, in partnership with Nari Samata Manch, found that around 75% of women surveyed in the Bohra community had been subjected to FGM. Globally, more than 230 million girls and women alive today have been subjected to the practice, according to UNICEF.

In 2018, a three-judge bench led by then Chief Justice Dipak Mishra observed that FGM appeared to violate a child’s right to privacy and bodily integrity. Soon after, the Dawoodi Bohra Women for Religious Freedom, a group formed specifically to oppose the PIL, intervened. The case was referred to a larger bench, then clubbed with the Sabarimala temple-entry review and other religious-freedom petitions to be heard by a nine-judge Constitution Bench. In the years since, while the case waited, the practice continued.

Where it stands now

The nine-judge bench, headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant, began hearing the clubbed petitions in April 2026. Together, the cases ask the court to clarify the scope of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the “essential religious practices” doctrine that has been used to determine what falls within their protection.

Masooma Ranalvi, founder of WeSpeakOut and herself a survivor, is a formal intervenor in the case. India remains one of 35 countries where FGM is documented but not specifically banned.

What happened on 7 May

Hearing arguments on the FGM petition, the bench made significant oral observations on the practice.

Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra, appearing for the petitioners, framed the constitutional argument squarely within the limitations that apply to both Article 25 and Article 26. “Where a practice intrudes into bodily autonomy and mutilates a vital organ, it necessarily falls foul of the limitations under Articles 25 and 26, namely public order, health and morality,” he said.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi went further, suggesting that the case may not need to engage broader questions relating to the right to religious freedom at all, which are under review in the petition. “As far as female genital mutilation is concerned, we may not even need to travel into all these other rights. The expressions ‘health’ and ‘public health’ themselves may be sufficient,” he observed. He further distinguished, clearly, that “from a public health perspective, there is a difference between circumcision and genital mutilation.”

When opposing counsel attempted to compare the practice to male circumcision, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah was direct: “I’m surprised it is compared to circumcision (male); it is a different concept.”

Justice BV Nagarathna observed that the practice would also fall foul of the “morality” ground under Article 25. Through their remarks during the hearing, the bench acknowledged that the practice affects bodily integrity and sexual autonomy, physical and emotional health, the rights of the child, and is shaped by the social and community pressures that compel families to comply.